Andrew Duff (European Policy Centre)

Ursula von der Leyen was always equivocal at being marked out as the Spitzenkandidat of the European People’s Party (EPP). She refused to stand as a German CDU candidate for the European Parliamentary elections. Retaining the broad cross-party confidence of national leaders was vital to her chances of being renominated for the Commission presidency. Her supporters in the European Council included French President Macron, a Liberal, and German Chancellor Scholz, a Social Democrat. In the formal vote by qualified majority at the European Council on 27 June, she managed to get Hungary’s illiberal Viktor Orban to vote against her, and Italy’s eurosceptic Giorgia Meloni to abstain. Those manoeuvres undoubtedly helped von der Leyen’s cause in the European Parliament. 

At Strasbourg on 18 July, in a secret ballot, Ursula von der Leyen needed the votes of an absolute majority of MEPs. Her eventual election with a margin of 41 votes was in spite, rather than because, of her EPP membership. The fact that von der Leyen has had to fight for her job has won her a certain respect among political opponents. Her victory bolsters the EU’s centrist pro-European political forces in all the institutions and accentuates the relative marginalisation of the far right and far left. By successfully surfing as a Spitzenkandidat, she has established that that very process, although much misunderstood, will be resurrected again in 2029.

Building the team

Over the summer, von der Leyen will construct a college of 26 other Commissioners from those lucky enough to be nominated by the member states. She has decided not to try to reduce the size of the Commission below 27, although this would be perfectly possible to do under Article 17(5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Von der Leyen will find it difficult to reject unattractive Commission candidates served up by national capitals. But she can — and will — exercise to the full her powers of patronage by promoting those she likes to important jobs and by demoting those she likes less. 

Although von der Leyen is at her most powerful as President-elect, she must operate within certain implicit constraints. Her new Commission will have to respect gender and regional balance, as well as a reasonable share-out among the political parties. In doling out Commission portfolios, she will be subject to constant pressure from member state governments, some of which, but not all, deem it very important to have their national Commissioner in a prestigious or opportunistic role. Does this signify a growing respect for the institution of the Commission in the general scheme of things? Possibly. 

Need for security

Success in the EU’s current battles against hostile populist and nationalist forces will be much assisted by providing at the top of the institutions plenty of evidence of stable, competent and effective government. Here von der Leyen’s second Commission will take pride of place. The European Council, evidently badly divided, is to be chaired by the unassuming Portuguese Antonio Costa, in succession to the underwhelming Belgian Charles Michel. Macron’s star is waning, as is that of Scholz; Mark Rutte has gone to NATO; Donald Tusk and Pedro Sanchez have ample trouble at home; Keir Starmer is not invited. Who is there other than the Commission President, also a member of the European Council, to offer strong leadership?

What kind of Commission is formed over the next few months therefore matters a lot. Von der Leyen would be advised not to lumber her second college with a tag: her ‘geopolitical Commission’ of 2019 has not worn well. Strategic autonomy is still a worthy enough aspiration for the Europe. An autonomous EU need not be too adventurous, but it must have its own coherent security strategy — even the more so if, as is likely, Donald Trump is returned as US President. 

How von der Leyen composes her college will set the scene for the next five years. Three novel appointments would be welcome. The first should be that of a Commissioner responsible for a portfolio of defence. As the Ukraine war rumbles on, the EU’s military insecurity becomes increasingly self-evident. The Commission should take the lead in boosting investment in arms procurement and in linking formally to NATO’s structures. 

A second new post should be that of an EU Attorney General. He or she would be responsible for advising the Commission on its role as guarantor of the treaties and enforcer of uniform EU law. A top priority for the high-level law officer would be to implement Article 7 TEU effectively, addressing breaches of the rule of law by errant member states. The post-holder should be a valid correspondent of the European Court of Justice and would oversee the Commission’s legal service. 

Another innovation at the disposal of the newly elected Commission President would be to redesignate and empower the senior Commissioner responsible for economic affairs as the EU’s Treasury Secretary. This would indicate a direction of travel towards fiscal federalism without which the euro will remain resting on uncertain foundations. The main task of the Treasury Secretary would be to raise funds for investment in European public goods.

So, three novel Commission appointments designed to imbue a sense of security among European citizens: military, civic and financial. A von der Leyen presidency committed to sound government in the interest of European security should calm the public mood and command respect. A Commission that was seen steadily to be implementing ambitious EU framework legislation, notably to combat the climate crisis and to tackle immigration, could even become popular. Ursula von der Leyen herself will wish to avoid becoming a lame duck President, while being happily relieved of the need to be re-elected in 2029. 

Widening without deepening

Lastly, then, how does Von der Leyen II grapple with the Union’s constitutional problems? In her closed meetings with the party groups in the European Parliament — in which many promises were made, some contradictory — von der Leyen was rarely asked about her views on constitutional reform. Her answer, well prepared, was that although she will not oppose treaty change, she will not lead the charge. Enlargement of the Union, in her view, should proceed detached from any commitment to internal reform. Here, incidentally, she departs from the official — but spurious — position of the European Council which is that the widening and deepening of the Union must proceed in parallel. 

Von der Leyen’s first term of office saw no concrete advance in the constitutional evolution of the Union. She would now be wise to take the matter of EU governance more seriously. In June 2022 and again last November, the European Parliament triggered a formal revision of the treaties under Article 48(2) TEU, aimed at ditching most national vetoes in favour of qualified majority voting. The European Council is already in breach of its treaty obligations by failing to react to Parliament’s initiatives. 

The truth is, however, that enlargement to Ukraine (to say nothing of the UK) without reform will be a terrible risk for the EU. If von der Leyen really finds these matters too difficult to deal with, she should appoint a group of wise experts to deliberate and deliver well-considered options for treaty change. Without movement towards more democratic and effective institutions, the Union will eventually fail as a federative polity — no matter what happens to Ukraine.