Théo Fournier (PhD in Law, European University Institute, Freelance researcher and consultant in state-capacity building and legal trainings)

Introduction and context

On Sunday 7 July 2024 at 20.00 pm, France – and a large part of EU Member States – welcomed the results of the second round of the legislative elections with immense relief: Marine Le Pen’s far-right party will not lead the second-largest economy in the EU for the coming years. 

As of 10 July 2024, the Rassemblement National (RN) secured the third place with 143 seats, behind the centre alliance (168 seats) and the left alliance (182 seats). This outcome defied all surveys predicting a substantial win for the far-right, given their strong performance in the European Parliament elections on June 9 (31% of the votes, twice as much as the runner-up) and the first round of the snap legislative elections on June 30 (33% of the votes, 5 points ahead of the left alliance). 

In pure numerical terms, RN’s loss is relative: over 10 million people voted for their programme. It gained 53 seats compared to two years ago and is now the largest party in the National Assembly. The RN's defeat can be attributed primarily to the union of the left, which seemed inconceivable just a month ago, and the revival of the so-called Republican Front. The RN's unreadiness to govern effectively, illustrated by over 80 of its candidates being nabbed for racist, antisemitic, and homophobic comments during the campaign, certainly played a part in their loss. For all these reasons, last Sunday’s results should be seen first and foremost as a vote against a project rather than a vote in favour of one. 

As I write this analysis, significant political manoeuvres are underway to determine who should be the next Prime Minister and what a coalition agreement might look like. Unfortunately, France’s politicians are lacking the culture of compromise essential to parliamentary negotiations. Chances are high that our politicians will struggle to reach such an agreement.

Why is the situation different now than during the last legislative term? 

Since the previous legislative elections in June 2022, the National Assembly has lacked an absolute majority. Despite this, President Macron managed to form his government and advance his policies. So, why is it different now? Can’t Macron simply renew the experience of a minority government?

In theory, Macron could form a minority government. Under the French Constitution, the government doesn't need a motion of confidence to be established. However, the Constitution allows the National Assembly to vote a motion of no-confidence against the government. Any minority government is thus at risk of being overthrown if the political opposition unites for that purpose. This is a key difference from the previous legislative term. The numbers are not in favour of a pro-Macron minority government now. Pro-Macron forces in Parliament are simply too weak to avoid being overthrown.

Another important factor to consider is the President’s exclusive power to dissolve the House. This power is both a Damocles sword for MPs and the cornerstone of France’s political stability. The threat of dissolution often saves a minority government in France. If past motions of no-confidence failed, it was because MPs feared losing their jobs. Had any motion passed, Macron would have dissolved the House and sent MPs back to their constituencies.

The key to understanding why the current situation is completely different lies in the last sentence of Article 12 of the French Constitution: “No further dissolution shall take place within a year following said election.” This changes everything. With the National Assembly free from the threat of dissolution for the coming year, minority governments are more exposed than ever to a motion of no-confidence. Macron is therefore compelled to appoint a Prime Minister who can secure support from the largest political coalition possible in the House.

Did France suddenly become a parliamentary regime? 

Has Macron become the new F. W. Steinmeier, a Head of State whose functions are mostly symbolic? There's no doubt that the equilibrium of French political life has shifted to the National Assembly. This is surely a difficult situation for a president who has pushed hyper-presidentialism to its limits. Yet, President Macron will likely remain a central figure in French politics simply because the Constitution grants him the tools to do so.

The Constitution foresees a series of “reserved powers” for the President, which are competencies exclusively in the President's hands. The first one is the nomination of the government (Article 8), which is subject to no formal rule. The Prime Minister does not have to be an MP, nor does he have to be from the winning majority. For example, President Macron could propose a non-consensual Prime Minister from the left alliance in hopes of increasing political tensions. It wouldn’t be the first time Macron has cynically favoured his own political agenda over the nation's interests. He has proven many times in recent years to be particularly adept at manipulating public opinion and institutional timing.

Other powers include the dissolution of the National Assembly (which he will regain in a year) and emergency powers (Article 16). The President will continue to preside over the Council of Ministers (Article 8), and he can refuse to sign ordinances and decrees deliberated upon there (Article 13 al.1). He is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and presides over the national defence council (Article 15), the same council that decides on military support to Ukraine and the deployment of French troops worldwide. Finally, President Macron will likely continue to represent France internationally (at the European Council, the G7, and NATO).

The general equilibrium of a democracy is subtle to achieve. Institutions are intertwined in a larger system of connected vessels. The legitimacy of one institution can fuel the illegitimacy of another, and an unstable institution can foster a more stable one.

How will these dynamics influence the conduct of politics in France? As I write these lines, the legislative elections have given a fair legitimacy boost to the National Assembly at the expense of Macron’s own legitimacy. The National Assembly, and the programs pushed by its leading forces, seem more legitimate in imposing their views on the next policies than Macron’s presidential program. But this won't last forever. Time will gradually erode the National Assembly's legitimacy, especially if it falls into rampant political instability. Macron’s legitimacy will rise again if he is perceived as a pole of stability, and with that, the legitimacy to use his reserved powers.

Amid the distraction of everyday politics and the oblivion it creates, it's crucial to remember that Macron is primarily responsible for the country’s current political uncertainty. He put France and the future of Europe at risk by calling for new elections when the far-right was at its peak. He made this decision alone, guided by a group of obscure and incompetent councillors who will never face political accountability for their actions. On June 9, our President placed the country in existential danger. On July 8, the French people saved it. Let’s not forget that.