Davide Genini (Dublin City University)

The 32^nd North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit in Washington D.C. has come to an end. It marked the 75^th anniversary of NATO’s existence. Founded on 9 April 1949 in Washington by 12 nations in response to the brutality of the Second World War, NATO remains the cornerstone of North Atlantic security, now embracing 32 states. Additionally, the Washington NATO summit highlighted the third year of Russia’s brutal war of aggression in Ukraine. Unleashed on 24 February 2022, this war represents the most remarkable “breach of civilisation” since the end of the Second World War, shattering European security based on rules over power. Both the European Union (EU) and NATO woke up to high-conventional warfare on their borders, revealing their unpreparedness. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has reactivated transatlantic unity, demonstrating unexpected mutual support in addressing shared security threats.

On the heels of the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, NATO leaders took three key decisions for the future of European security at the Washington summit. The first strategic decision is to launch an exceptionally reinforced Ukraine defence package, consisting of five main measures. Needless to say, Ukraine represented the “most urgent” and “most critical” issue of the summit from the outset. Consequently, the North Atlantic Council agreed to provide training and military equipment to Ukraine under a centralised NATO Command for Ukraine, known as the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). Unlike the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM UA), the NSATU primarily serves coordination tasks and does not establish a formal NATO mission. However, there are doubts about the compatibility between NSATU and EUMAM, as the latter already provides coordination to Member States and like-minded partners through a clearinghouse cell. Indeed, a transfer of authority from EUMAM to NSATU is currently ruled out. Moreover, Allies operationalised the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre (JATEC), originally established by NATO Defence Ministers in February 2024, to ensure interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces. Additionally, NATO appointed a Senior Representative in Ukraine to deepen the Ukraine-NATO institutional relationship. NATO also announced immediate military support to Ukraine from Allied stocks, including additional strategic air defence systems.

In parallel, Allies announced a Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, aiming to provide at least €40 billion in lethal and non-lethal military support to Ukraine within the next year, including investments in the defence industry and training. Each Ally will contribute pro-rata through “proportional contributions” based on its GDP. However, it remains unclear how this €40 billion commitment to Ukraine will fit in with the fiscal constraints on EU Member States’ budgets, and whether the funds can be disbursed under EU programmes such as the European Peace Facility.

The second functional decision focuses on increasing defence spending and strengthening NATO’s defence industrial base as part of a broader transatlantic deterrence posture. Currently, 23 NATO members have met the 2% GDP benchmark in defence spending, with the remaining countries – Croatia, Portugal, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Spain – mostly committed to reaching this guideline by 2028 (this tally excludes Iceland, a founding member state of NATO that has no armed forces). Comparatively, in 2014 when Russia illegally annexed Crimea, only three Allies – the US, Greece, and the UK – exceeded the 2% target. The sharp increase in defence spending within NATO mirrors the EU’s achievement of 1.9% of GDP invested in defence in 2024. Maintaining defence investments above 2% of GDP is seen as crucial “to address existing shortfalls and meet requirements across all domains in a more contested security environment”.

In addition, NATO Allies launched the new NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge to enhance transatlantic defence industry cooperation and promote multinational procurement. In particular, NATO signed a $700 million contract for Stinger missiles, adding to contracts totalling $10 billion under the Defence Production Action Plan adopted in Vilnius in 2023. The NATO defence industrial base and the EU European Defence Industrial Strategy are mutually reinforcing, promoting joint acquisitions across the Atlantic.

The third contentious decision concerns the relationship between Ukraine and NATO, and more broadly, NATO enlargement. Ukraine’s pathway towards NATO membership is deemed “irreversible” given the progressive implementation of reforms by the Ukrainian government. Therefore, Ukraine is set to accede to NATO soon, following the memberships of Finland and Sweden, marking the 11th enlargement in NATO’s history. While it is certain that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO”, it is a precondition that all “Allies agree and conditions are met” pursuant to Art. 10 of the Washington Treaty, postponing Ukraine’s accession to NATO sine die. In reality, there is no consensus within the North Atlantic Council to extend an invitation to Ukraine at this stage – notably, Hungary and Turkey oppose it – and setting a precise timeline has been considered politically premature.

The accession of Ukraine to NATO is closely intertwined with EU security matters. The EU granted candidate status to Ukraine in June 2022, opened accession negotiations in December 2023, and held the first intergovernmental conference on accession in June 2024. Although Ukraine’s path to NATO and the EU runs concurrently, each process is autonomous and follows distinct trajectories that will culminate, mutatis mutandis, at different historical moments. In the wave of previous enlargements involving former Warsaw Pact states, Ukraine’s accession to NATO is expected to precede its accession to the EU due to less burdensome convergence criteria, primarily focusing on military-centric aspects.

A latere to the NATO summit in Washington, the UK took the (fourth) historic decision to finalise a future EU-UK security agreement “complementary” to NATO. This move, prompted by developments at the 2024 NATO Summit and the Labour Party’s victory in the UK elections, would mark the institutionalisation of post-Brexit EU-UK security relations. The agreement would build on the 2019 Political Declaration to establish a “broad, comprehensive, and balanced security partnership”. It aims to fill the gaps of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement by establishing a normative framework for the EU-UK relationship in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

In conclusion, the 2024 NATO summit in Washington cemented the Alliance as the central player in European military-security affairs. Celebrating 75 years since its foundation, NATO is undergoing a rejuvenation. With 32 member nations, NATO is larger than ever, and the notion that it is a brain-dead entity is now a relic of the past. At the summit, Allies pledged up to €40 billion annually in military support to Ukraine, surpassing the €33 billion provided by the EU over the past two years. NATO has also centralised training programmes spanning both sides of the Atlantic, aiming to become a cornerstone of Ukraine’s security framework. Additionally, NATO has become a hub for the defence industry, facilitating transatlantic joint procurement efforts similar to the European Defence Agency (EDA) within the EU. Interestingly, the European pillar overshadowed the US in terms of advancements during the NATO summit in Washington. From increased defence spending to bolstered joint procurement initiatives and commitments towards Ukraine’s accession, EU Member States assumed greater security responsibilities while reaffirming NATO as the bedrock of collective defence. Looking ahead, it will be crucial for the new Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy to prioritise the implementation of these commitments within the EU, especially with the upcoming US elections in November 2024 on the horizon. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg aptly stated, “NATO is good for Europe, but it’s also good for [the] United States”.